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EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES
DAVID W. LOUiSELL* AND BYRON M. CeippiNr, JR.**
At the Evidence Institute held at~the Northwest Regional Meet-
ing of the American Bar Association in St. Paul on October 14.
1955,1 it- was suggested by several participants that the Enabling
Acts, 2 both federal and state, authorizing the promulgation of Rules
of Civil Procedure, empower the United States and Minnesota
Supreme Courts to enact for their respective jurisdictions the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence. In support of the suggestion' reference
was made to Rules of Civil Procedure 43 and 44, federal and state,
which concern form .nd admissibility of evidence, scope of exami-
nation and cross-examination, the effect of res ipsa loquitur (Minne-
sota Rule), authentication of copies of official records, and other
provisions as to formalities of proof. No distinction was drawn be-
tween evidentiary problems which are dearly and perhaps exclu-
sively within the Bar's-competence and ken, as "tools of the trade,"
such as Rules 43 and 44, burden of persuasion, presumptions, judi-
cial notice and the like, and other evidentiary problems which,
although of great practical interest to the lawyer, gravely concern
the layman too by their reach into philosophical, sociological and
political issues.
Perhaps foremost in the latter category of evidentiary problems
are those which concern the privileges.' It is clear that their recog-
nition constitutes a perpetual threat to the ascertainment of truth in
any given litigation. It is also clear that m the judgment of western
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; Visiting Professor of Law.
University of California, Berkeley, 1956; member, Minnesota, New York and
District of Columbia Bars.
**Law Clerk to Hon. Edward J. Devitt, United States District Judge for
the District of Minnesota; member, Minnesota Bar.
1. Participants in the panel were Hon. Leslie L. Anderson, District
Judge Hennepin County, Minnesota, presiding; Hon. Alexander Holtzoff,
Judge United States District Codrt for the District of Columbia, moderator;
and Prof. Edmund M. Morgan, Law School, Vanderbilt University; Acting
Dean David W. Louisell, Law School, University of Minnesota; Mr. Edwin
Conrad, attorney, Madison, Wisconsin, Mir. Frederic M. Miller, attorney,
Des Moines, Iowa, Mr. Edwin-Cassexa, attorney, Omaha, Nebraska, Mr.
Harry H. Peterson, attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Mr. E. M. Hall,Q.C., Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.
2. 28 U. S. C. § 2072 (1952), Minn. Stat. § 480.051 (1953).
3. The suggestion, if valid, could be applicable without further legisla-
tion in Minnesota only to civil actions because Mim. Stat. § 480.051 (1953)
confers the rule-making power on the Supreme Court only for civil actions,
and there is yet no comparable legislation for criminal actions.
4. The principal evidentiary privileges, other than that against self-
incrrnination, are now stated in Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (1953). In the Uniform
Rules of Evidence (1953) the privileges, including that against self-mcrimi-
nation, are treated in "V. Privileges," Rules 23 through 40.
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society, this is not too great a price to pay for the value of secrecy
in certain human relationships, notably in the United States those
of clergyman-penitent, lawyer-client, doctor-patient and husband-
wife. We think it would be difficult indeed to sustain the proposition
that the Minnesota Legislature, by its Enabling Act, intended to dele-
gate its power in this area of legislation to the Supreme Court. Nor
in our opinion would such a delegation be in accord with basic
conceptions of legislative power prevailing in American society For
these privileges are too much a part of the social fabric to be the
exclusive preserve of professional expertise. True, they raise prob-
lems of legal practice and judicial administration, but also philo-
sophical, psychological and, in the fine sense of the word, political,
problems which in a democratic society must at least in the first in-
stance be fought out in legislative halls, unless they are constitution-
ally foreclosed.
This, of course, is not to say that the Bench and Bar should not
provide leadership in the public discussion of the acceptability of
the Uniform Rules' provisions on the privileges. Obviously lawyers
and judges are generally in the best position to lead and enlighten
such discussion. And, while we think they should not under the
guise of the Enabling Act preempt decision, we hope they will
inform legislative and public opinion on the extent and significance
of the changes that would be made in the Minnesota law of privileges
by the Uniform Rules. The purpose of this article is to aid perform-
ance of that task. Time limitations have restricted us to the husband-
wife, lawyer-client and clergyman-penitent relations. But changes
resulting from other provisions of the Uniform Rules, principally
those on self-incrimination and the physician-patient relation,6 are
also important. For example, Uniform Rule 23(4) would work a
great change in existing law by providing "If an accused in a
criminal action does not testify, counsel may comment upon ac-
cused's failure to testify, and the trier of fact may draw all reason-
able inferences therefrom." This change might raise a constitutional
question.7 It is hoped that the privilege problems not discussed here
may also be studied and discussed before the Uniform Rules are
thrown into the lap of the legislature.
5. For contrary view see companion article by DeParcq, p. 322.
6. For discussion of physician-patient relationship, see companion article
by Geer & Adamson, p. 356.
7 State v. Wolfe, 64 S. D. 178, 266 N. W 116 (1936), cf. Adamson v.
California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947). Minn. Stat. § 611.11 (1953) now provides
that the failure of a defendant to testify in a criminal case shall not be
alluded to by the prosecuting attorney or the court.
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MAxiTAL EvniENTI .Y PR= EGES
Comparable Statutory and Rule Provisions.
The present statutory law of Minnesota on the marital eviden-
tiary privileges appears in Minn. Stat. § 595.02(1) (1953) as
follows:
... (1, A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife
without her consent, nor a wife for or against her husband with-
out his consent, nor can either, during the marriage or after-
wards, without the consent of the other, be examined as to any
communication made by one to the other during the marriage.
This exception does not apply to a civil action or proceeding by
one against the other, nor to a criminal action or proceeding for
a crime committed by one against the other, nor to an action or
proceeding for-abandonment and neglect of the wife or children
by the husband; ...
Unlike the foregoing section, the Uniform Rules treat the
marital evidentiary privilege in two separate rules. One concerns
accused spouses in criminal actions, the other, spouses whether or
not parties to actions.
Rule 23. Priilege of Accused.
... (2) An accused in a criminal action has a privilege to pre-
vent his spouse from testifying in such action with respect to any
confidential communication had or made between them while
they were husband and wife, excepting only (a) in an action
in which the accused is charged with (i) a crime involving the
marriage relation, or (ii) a crime against the person or prop-
erty of the other spouse or the child of either spouse, or (iii) a
desertion of the other spouse or a child of either spouse, or (b)
as-to the communication, in an action in which the accused offers
evidence of-a communication between himself and his spouse..
Rule 28. Marital Privilege-Confidential Communications.
(1) General Rule. Subject to Rule 37 and except as other-
wise provided in Paragraphs (2) and (3) of this rule, a spouse
who transmitted to the other the information which constitutes
the communication, has a privilege during the marital relation-
ship which he may claim whether or not he is a party to the
action, to refuse to disclose and to prevent the other from dis-
dosing communications found by the judge to have been had
or made in confidence between them while husband and wife.
The other spouse or the guardian of an incompetent spouse may
claim the privilege on behalf of the spouse having the privilege.
(2) Exceptions Neither spouse may claim such privilege
(a) in an action by one spouse against the other spouse, or (b)
8. The marital evidentiary privilege m the Uniform Rules is stated
separately for (i) the accused spouse m a criminal action, and (ii) for spouses
generally whether or not parties to an action. Item (i) is combined in Uni-
form Rule 23 with the privilege of the accused not to be called as a witness
and not to testify.
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in an action for damages for the alienation of the affections of
the other, or for criminal conversation with the other, or (c)
in a criminal action in which one of them is charged with a
crime against the person or property of the other or of a child
of either, or a crime against the person or property of a third
person committed in the course of committing a crime against
the other, or bigamy or adultery, or desertion of the other or of
a child of either, or (d) in a criminal action in which the accused
offers evidence of a communication between him and his spouse,
or (e) if the judge finds that sufficient evidence, aside from the
communication, has been introduced to warrant a finding that
the communication was made, in whole or in part, to enable or
aid anyone to commit or to plan to commit a crime or a tort.
(3) Termination. A spouse who would otherwise have a
privilege under this rule has no such privilege if the judge finds
that he or the other spouse while the holder of the privilege
testified or caused another to testify in any action to any com-
munication between the spouses upon the same subject matter.
Prwilege against Adverse Testimony of a Spouse, and Privilege of
Confidentil Communcations.
Undoubtedly the most significant departure of the Uniform
Rules from present Minnesota law in the matter of husband and
wife evidentiary privileges is the complete abolition, except as to
confidential communications, of the privilege of one spouse to pre-
vent the testimony of the other spouse either for or against himY
Under the provisions of Uniform Rules 23(2) and 28, one spouse
cannot prevent the favorable or adverse testimony, as such, of the
other. There can be no doubt that this is a substantial change from
the present practice, not only in Minnesota,' 0 but in other states as
well."
With respect to the other existing Minnesota marital evidentiary
privilege, that protecting communications from one spouse to the
other, the Uniform Rules retain the privilege with certain modifying
and clarifying changes.' 2
Who May Assert the Prvilege of Confidential Communication.
Rule 28 would permit a spouse to claim the privilege against
9. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rules 23(2) and 28 (1953). Minnesota
presently recognizes the privilege against adverse testimony by one's spouse.
Minn. Stat. § 595.02(1) (1953) For a recent survey of the Minnesota law
on marital evidentiary privileges see Note, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 251 (1952)
10. Illustrative of situations where the Minnesota courts under present
statutory provisions have sustained the privilege against adverse testimony
of a spouse are Ingersoll v. Odendahl, 136 Minn. 428, 162 N. W 525 (1917)',
State v. Frey, 76 Minn. 526, 79 N. W 518 (1899) , Lloyd v. Simons, 90 Minn.
237, 244, 95 N. W 903, 905-06 (1903) (dictum) , Wolford v. Farnham, 44
Minn. 159, 164, 46 N. W 295, 297 (1890) (dictum).
11. See McCormick, Evidence § 66 n. 3 (1954).
12. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rules 23(2) and 28 (1953).
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disclosure of confidential communications even though that spouse
is not a party to the particular action in which the question is
raised. Allowing a non-party spouse to assert the privilege against
disclosure conforms to prior language of the Minnesota Supreme
Court?3 Conversely, it is doubtful whether a party who is not a
spouse holder of the privilege may avail hiimself of this privilege.14
Although the question has not been free from doubt in our state,
it appears from the reported decisions that either the spouse who
communicates the information (the communicator) or the listening
spouse (the communicatee) can assert the privilege against dis-
closure of communications between them.1 5 Rule 23 retains this
dual privilege where the claimant spouse is the accused in a criminal
action. But under Rule 28 a spouse is accorded the privilege only
if he or she was the communicator.18 We see little to justify this
distinction. Granting or withholding the privilege according to
whether a spouse talks or listens perhaps results from a fictive as-
similation of the position of the spouse-communicatee to that of the
professional person in the professional privilege situation. Realis-
tically, both husband and wife in a talk between them are essentially
in the same position in respect of need of the privilege whether at a
given moment husband or wife is speaker or listener. We think that
the privilege should be recognized whether the spouse is communi-
cator or communicatee, and whether or not he is the accused in a
criminal proceeding.
Confidentiality of Communications.
Judged by various earlier expressions of the Court,'- it appears
that the specific requirement of confidentiality imposed by the Uni-
13. Gjesdahl v. Harmon, 175 Minn. 414, 420, 221 N. IV. 639, 641 (1928)(dictum).
14. Sommerfeld v. Griffith, 173 Minn. 51, 56, 216 N. W 311, 313 (1927)(dictum).
15. Beckett v. Northwestern Masomc Aid Ass'n, 67 Mfinn. 298,69 N. ,V.
923 (1897) ; Newstrom v. St Paul & D R. R., 61 Minn. 78, 63 N. NV. 253
(1895) ; Leppla v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 35 Minn. 310, 312, 29 N. W. 127,
128 (1886) (dictum) ; accord, Leonard v. Green, 30 Minn. 496, 501, 16 N. W
399, 400 (1883).
16. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 28(1). This accords with 8 Wig-
more Evidence § 2340 (3d ed. 1940) and apparently McCormick, Evidence
§ 87 (1954). Note that Rule 28(1) does provide: "The other spouse or the
guardian of an incompetent spouse may claim the privilege on behalf of the
spouse having the privilege!'
17. White v. White, 101 Minm. 451, 453, 112 N. V 627, 628 (1907)
(dictum) ; Newstrom v. St. Paul & D. R. R., 61 Min. 78, 83, 63 N. IV. 253,
254 (1895) (dictum) ; Leppla v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 35 Minn. 310, 312,
29 N. W 127, 128 (1886) (dictum); See Note, 32 Min. L. Rev. 262, 268-69(1948).
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form Rules' s as a condition of protection of the communication
constitutes an important and, in our opinion, beneficial clarification
of present Minnesota law. In view of the policy grounds upon which
the privilege is said to rest,19 particularly the encouragement of
full disclosure of confidential matters between spouses, it does not
seem appropriate or necessary to extend this protection to non-con-
fidential disclosures. That some limitations upon the general pro-
tection of all spousal communications might be necessary was recog-
nized as early as 1886 in Leppla v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 20 where
the court observed that the protection of communications between
spouses might be inapplicable to a situation which by its very nature
anticipated public disclosure, as where a wife is told to conduct
certain business as agent for her husband. Consistent with other
general provisions, 2' Rule 28 specifically places upon the court
responsibility for determination of the genuineness of the con-
fidentiality of the communication between husband and wife. Prac-
tically speaking, this is another area in which it may be difficult for
the court properly to appraise the validity of the asserted privilege
without requiring some disclosure of that which the privilege exists
to protect. Wigmore would presume the confidentiality of husband-
wife communications.
22
Duratwn and Scope of the Prilege.
The communication not only must have been confidential, but
also must have been made during the time that the spouses were
husband and wife. Only communications between the spouses dur-
ing the period of the marriage relationship are protected under
either the present Minnesota rule25 or Uniform Rule 28(1) More-
over, Uniform Rule 28(1) also expressly limits the exercise of the
privilege to the duration of the marriage, whereas Rule 23(2) does
not contain a similar express limitation although its use of "spouse"
may mean "spouse at the time of the criminal action." Neither
18. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 28 (1953).
19. See discussion mfra on policy bases for marital evidentiary privileges.
20. 35 Minn. 310, 312, 29 N. W 127, 128 (1886) (dictum).
21. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 45 (1953). Subject to contrary
provisions of other rules, Rule 45 allows judicial exclusion of evidence if the
probative value is "substantially outweighed by the risk" that admitting it
will (a) consume too much time, (b) "create substantial danger of undue
prejudice" or confusion of issues, or (c) without reasonable notice unfairly
and detrimentally surprise a party.
22. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2336 (3d ed. 1940).
23. Minn. Stat. § 595.02(1) (1953), Leppla v. Minnesota Tribune Co.,
35 Minn. 310, 312, 29 N. W 127, 128 (1886) (dictum).
[Vol. 40:41.3
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES
death2 4 nor divorce- presently terminates the right to claim the
privilege. The privilege in part is based on the policy of avoiding
marital discord that might result from revelations of marital con-
fidence. This policy is satisfied by Rule 28's limitation of the
duration of the privilege to the duration of the marriage. But the
privilege is also, and we think more importantly, based on the
policy of promoting full and frank marital disclosures. This policy
requires a protection that continues beyonddivorce or death, and we
therefore think our present law preferable to that of Uniform Rule
28 on this point.
If a statement is confidential, it seems immaterial whether it be
oral or written. Apparently this is the present Minnesota law,20 and
the Uniform Rules would not change it. But there is nothing in the
Uniform Rules to clarify the existing uncertainty as to whether acts
by one spouse in the presence of the other are "communications"
within the privilege.27 There is certainly nothing in the Uniform
Rules to arrest the apparent tendency to restrict the privilege to
verbal and written disclosures, as contrasted to physical acts. -6
Procedural Aspects.
Little has been said by the Minnesota court on another interest-
ing and important phase of this subject, that of raising on appeal
rulings on claimed privileges.2 9 According to Wigmore, when the
privilege is wrongfully sustained the error should be corrected on
appeal, since relevant evidence was wrongfully excluded with the
consequence of an adjudication not based on all the facts.30 Likewise
most courts will correct on appeal an erroneous overruling of an
asserted privilege, although Wigmore would not, at least not where
-the claimant of the privilege is a non-party.31
Only one entitled to assert the privilege may predicate error on the
24. In re Estate of Osbon, 205 Minn. 419, 286 N. W 306 (1939) (al-
ternative holding) ; Beckett v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Ass'n, 67 Minn.
298, 69 N. W. 923 (1897), Newstrom v. St. Paul & D. R. R., 61 Minn. 78,
63 N. W. 253 (1895) ; Gjesdahl v. Harmon, 175 Minn. 414, 420, 221 N. W.
639, 641 (1928) (dictum); accord, Bunker v. United Order of Foresters, 97
Minn. 361, 363, 107 N. W. 392, 393 (1906).
25. In re Estate of Osbon, 205 Minn. 419, 286 N. IV. 306 (1939)
(alternative holding).
26. Accord, Bunker v. United Order of Foresters, 97 Minn. 361,
363, 107 N. W. 392, 393 (1906) ; see Chamberlayne, Evidence § 1166 (1919);
5 Jones, Evidence § 2146 (2d ed. 1926).
27. See McCormick, Evidence § 83 (1954); 8 Wigmore, Evidence §
2337 (3d ed. 1940), Note, 36 Minm. L. Rev. 251, 254-55 (1952) ; 34 Minn. L.
Rev. 257 (1950).
28. MfcCormick, Evidence § 83 (1954).
29. See Note, 36 M1irn. L. Rev. 251, 260 (1952).




disallowance of his claim under Uniform Rule 40. This clarification
seems reasonable, recognizing, as it impliedly does, that the privilege
is limited by the policy reasons which justify it and is not intended
for use as an implement of trial and appellate advocacy
In the event that one who possesses a privilege was wrongfully
compelled over a proper claim of privilege to disclose that which is
privileged, the evidence so obtained would be inadmissible under
Rule 38, against the holder of the privilege. This is a desirable
sanction practically necessary for the vitality of the privilege.
Exceptions to the Marital Evidentary Prileges.
Both the Minnesota Statutei and the Uniform Rules" recog-
nize the necessity of excepting certain classes of action from the
marital privileges. For example, exceptions have long been deemed
necessary to protect one spouse, generally the wife, from being
unable to prove personal violence and harm by the other.3 These
injuries are frequently difficult of proof without the injured spouse's
testimony Such an exception seems to assume, however, not only
the difficulty of obtaining independent proof of the facts, but
also that the family harmony for which the privilege in part exists
is already gone or at best weakened. 85
Common to both the Uniform Rules8" and the Minnesota
Statute37 is an exception which removes the marital privilege in
the case of civil actions between spouses.
Under the Minnesota statutory exceptions marital privileges are
inapplicable to criminal actions for a crime committed by one spouse
against the other.38 In applying this exception for purposes of per-
mitting adverse testimony of a spouse, the Minnesota court has
largely refused to include within the category of crimes against the
other spouse, those offenses not involving personal, physical injury
to the spouse, and which for want of more appropriate description
may be termed "moral injures."9 Adultery is an example of the
32. Minn. Stat § 595.02(1) (1953).
33. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rules 23(2) (a) and 28(2) (1953).
34. See Chamberlayne, Evidence § 1155 (1919), 8 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2239 (3d ed. 1940), 48 Mich. L. Rev. 546 n. 2 (1950).
35. State v. Feste, 205 Minn. 73, 75-76, 285 N. W 85, 87 (1939)(dictum).
36. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 28(2) (a) (1953).
37 Minn. Stat. § 595.02(1) (1953).
38. State v. Feste, 205 Minn. 73, 75, 285 N. W 85, 87 (1939) (dictum)(exception not applicable to crimes committed prior to marriage).
39. State v. Lasher, 131 Minn. 97, 154 N. W 735 (1915), State v.
Marshall, 140 Minn. 363, 365, 168 N. W 174, 175 (1918) (dictum) , State v.
Armstrong, 4 Minn. (Gil. 251) 335 (1860) (dictum). Spousal testimony,
however, was allowed m an adultery prosecution of a third party. State v.




latter class of conduct.40 Rule 28(2) (c) specifically excepts crimes
involving adultery and bigamy from the privilege. Actions by one
spouse against third parties charging them with alienating the
affections of the other spouse have presented unique problems in
the application of the present privilege ;41 under Uniform Rule
28(2) (b) it is clear that the privilege is non-existent in these cases,
and in criminal conversation cases.
An action based upon charges that the husband abandoned or
neglected his wife or children is excepted under the present Minne-
sota Statute.42 The Uniform Rules more comprehensively except
from the benefits of the privilege those spouses who are charged
with crimes against the marriage relation 3 or with desertion of the
other spouse or the child of either.44
The Uniform Rules also make it explicit that the concept of
crimes committed by one spouse against the other includes property
crimes as well as those against the person of the spouse or a child
of either.n 45 Likewise excepted from the privilege are criminal prose-
cutions against a spouse who is charged with committing a crime
against the person or property of a third person in the course of
criminal conduct against the other spouse."'
Communications between spouses enabling or aiding criminal
or tortious conduct by anyone are similarly non-privileged under
Rule 28(2) (e). Comparable principles presently apply to the at-
torney-client relationship at least as respects criminal and fraudulent
conduct.4 7 Under Rule 28 the existence of this exception can be
determined only from sufficient evidence aside from the communica-
tion. It is difficult to think of any valid objection to this clarification
of the present law. Certainly communications facilitating a crime
or an intentional or wanton tort are not entitled to confidentiality.
Requiring the court to base its ruling upon evidence other than the
communication itself preserves confidentiality which would other-
wise be lost by requiring disclosure of the contents of the communi-
cation for purposes of determining the proper ruling upon the
claimed privilege.
40. Ibid.
41. See Gjesdahl v. Harmon, 175 Minn. 414, 420, 221 N. W 639, 641(1928) ; Huot v. Wise, 27 Minn. 68, 69-70, 6 N. XV. 425, 426 (1880).
42. Minn. Stat. § 595.02(1) (1953).
43. Uniform Rules of Evidence Rule 23(2) (a) (i) (1953).
44. Id. at Rule 28(2) c) ; Rule 23(2) (a) (iii).
45. Id. at Rule 28 (2) (c).
46. Ibid.
47 See McCormick, Evidence § 99 (1954) (crime or fraud), 8 Wig-
more, Evidence § 2298 (3d ed. 1940) (criminal or fraudulent transaction).
See also note 79 nira.
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Waiver of the Prwilege.
Minnesota has previously recognized that one may waive the
marital privilege against adverse testimony of a spouse by calling
the other spouse as one's own witness. 48 However, the waiver has
been restricted to non-communicative aspects unless the spouse
in whose favor the privilege runs, elicits testimony relating to com-
munications between them. 49 Termination and waiver are speci-
fically covered by the Uniform Rules. Rule 28(3) provides that tile
privilege against disclosure is terminated if either spouse "while the
holder of the privilege testified or caused another to testify in any
action to any communication between the spouses upon the same
subject matter." Thus, under Rule 28 it would be clear that waiver
could be effected by testimony by either spouse while holder of the
privilege "upon the same subject matter" given prior to the trial
at which the privilege is invoked. This is accordant with the phi-
losophy of the Rules against piece-meal waiver of confidentiality
However, with respect to the scope of waiver under Rule
23(2) (b) and Rule 28(2) (d) by an accused spouse who reveals
the contents of one confidential spousal communication, it is not
entirely clear whether the waiver is confined to the contents of that
particular communication, whether it extends to all communications
on the same subject as it does in cases under Rule 28(3), or whether
it is broad enough to include all communications between the spouses
on any subject. Rule 23(2) insofar as pertinent says " An ac-
cused in a criminal action has a privilege to prevent his spouse
from testifying in such action with respect to any confidential com-
munication between them while they were husband and wife,
excepting only (b) as to the communication, in an action in
which the accused offers evidence of a communication between him-
self and his spouse." (emphasis added)
On this the draftsmen have commented " Exception (b) is
necessary to prevent the accused from offering evidence of com-
munications favorable to himself and then claiming the privilege as
to those which are unfavorable." The language of the comment
lends support to the literal interpretation under which this excep-
tion to the accused's privilege encompasses any spousal communica-
tions and is actually broader, in respect of scope of waiver, than
the corresponding provision of Rule 28(3) This is hardly con-
sistent with the generally more liberal allowance of confidentiality
48. State v. Stearns, 184 Minn. 452, 238 N. W 895 (1931).
49. National German-American Bank v. Lawrence, 77 Minn. 282, 290,
80 N. W 363, 364 (1899) (dictum).
I[Vol. 40:413
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under Rule 23 than under Rule 28. With at least several interpreta-
tions of Rule 23(2) ) b) and Rule 28(2) (d) possible, it is submitted
that clarification of their meaning is desirable.
In addition to the specific waiver provisions, the general provi-
sion on waiver in the Uniform Rules, Rule 37, provides for waiver
of the privilege whenever the court finds that any person while
holder of the privilege has either contracted with anyone else not to
claim the privilege or with full knowledge of his right to assert it
has made voluntary disclosure of any part of the privileged matter,
or consented to the disclosure by anyone of such matter.50
Comments on Assertion of the Privilege.
From a tactical standpoint, the subject of permissible references
to and inferences from the assertion of the privilege is important. In
cases where the privilege against adverse testimony by one's spouse
has been asserted, the Minnesota court has allowed the other part,
to call attention to the assertion of the privilege, by asking for the
testimony of the other spouse necessitating the exercise of the
privilege in the presence of the jury,5' even where it was known
in advance of trial that the privilege would be claimed.52 By dicta,
the Minnesota court has indicated that in an appropriate case the
trial court may instruct the jury that it should not weigh against
the party claiming the privilege the fact of such claim. 53
If Minnesota should adopt the Uniform Rules, this particular
subject would be explicitly covered by Rule 39. Rule 39 generally
prohibits comment by court or counsel, the raising of presumptions,
or the drawing of adverse inferences from the exercise of the privi-
leges protected by the Uniform Rules. Moreover, the court, on re-
quest of the party asserting the privilege, may instruct the jury in
support of the privilege whenever the circumstances are such that
the jury may misunderstand and draw unfavorable inferences. The
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws consider this Rule to be
substantially contrary to Model Code of Evidence Rule 233 which
would allow comment on the exercise of a privilege by either judge
or counsel (except that both Rules -would permit comment on the
50. Quaere, as to the desirability of allowing one spouse to waive the
privilege on behalf of both. Assuming that both the communicator and commum-
catee spouses hold the privilege (compare Rule 23 with Rule 28), we have a
dual ownership which contrasts with the professional privileges.
51. State v. Roby, 128 Minn. 187, 150 N. V. 793 (1915), accord,
State v. Virgens, 128 Minn. 422, 151 N. W 190 (1915).
52. State v. Roby, 128 Minn. 187, 150 N. W 793 (1915).
53. Id. at 192, 150 N. W at 795.
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failure of a defendant in a criminal case to testify) 14 However,
the Commissioners consider that they have adopted the majority
state view 55 Rule 39 is subject to the important exception that the
failure of a criminal defendant to take the stand and testify is sub-
ject to comment by counsel and inference by the court or jury as
triers of fact. 6
Should Minnesota Adopt the Uniform Rules of Marital
Evidentiary Privilege?
If Minnesota adopts Rules 23 and 28 in their present form, a
drastic change from existing law will result from the abolition of the
privilege against adverse testimony of a spouse. This privilege is
generally less favorably viewed than that accorded to confidential
communications,5 7 although both conventionally have been based
in part on the same policy grounds, promotion of marital harmony 58
The privilege against adverse spousal testimony is rooted deeply
in Minnesota's history and popular acceptance, and its proposed
abolition should command the careful deliberation of the Legislature.
Adoption of Rules 23 and 28 would result in desirable clarifica-
tions of the marital confidential communications privilege, includ-
ing greater particularization of the exceptions to the privilege, addi-
tion of an express requirement of confidentiality, specific exception
from the privilege of communications in aid of illegal conduct, and
recognition of the privilege when claimed by its holder even though
he is not a party to the action.
However, other provisions of Rules 23 and 28 do not appear to
be either necessary or beneficial changes of existing Minnesota law
We do not agree with the provision of Rule 28 thAt only the com-
municator has the privilege. Moreover, limiting the duration of the
privilege to the duration of the marriage is an undue curtailment,
for no adequate reason, of the policy of encouraging full and frank
discussion between spouses.5 9 Finally, as noted, there is possible
54. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Comment to Rule 39 (1953) Wigmore
summarizes argument in favor of permitting comment upon the exercise of
the evidentiary privileges. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2272, 2272(a) (3d
ed. 1940) (privileges against self-incrimination).
55. See note 54 supra.
56. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 23(4) (1953) , see note 7 supra.
57 See McCornick, Evidence § 66 (1954), 30 B. U. L. Rev. 135, 138
(1950). In its criminal aspects the drafters of the Uniform Rules refer to
the privileges against adverse spousal testimony as "largely a sentimental
relic. " Uniform Rules of Evidence, Comment to Rule 23, Subdivision (2)(1953). See Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of
Evidence: Family Relations, 13 Minn. L. Rev. 675 (1929).
58. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2332 (3d ed. 1940), 34 Minn. L. Rev.
257 (1950).
59. Chamberlayne, Evidence § 1166 (1919) , McCormick, Evidence
§ 90 (1954) (appraises merit of this policy argument).
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ambiguity in Rule 23(2) (b)'s waiver provision applicable to an
accused spouse who introduces evidence of "a communication."
ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
Comparison of Statute and Uniform Rules.
Minn. Stat. § 595.02(2) (1953) sets forth the present privilege
accorded to confidential communications between clients and their
attorneys. The statute provides:
... (2) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him or
his advice given thereon in the course of professional duty; nor
can any employee of such attorney be examined as to such com-
mumcation or advice, without the client's consent; ...
It will be observed that the statute protects both communications by
the client and advice from the attorney. It protects both not only
from compulsory disclosure by the attorney but by his employees
as well.
Provisions comparable to the Minnesota Statute are found in
Uniform Rule 26. However, this Rule treats the whole subject of
attorney-client evidentiary privilege with greater particularity. It
provides:
Rule 26. Lawyer-Client Pri~lege.
(1) General Rule. Subject to Rule 37 and except as other-
,vise provided by Paragraph 2 of this rule communications
found by the judge to have been between lawyer and his client
in the course of that relationship and in professional confidence,
are privileged, and a client has a privilege (a) if he is the witness
to refuse t6 disclose any such communication, and (b) to pre-
vent his lawyer from disclosing it, and (c) to prevent any other
witness from disclosing such communication if it came to the
knowledge of such witness (i) in the course of its transmittal
between the client and the lawyer, or (ii) in a manner not rea-
sonably to be anticipated by the client, or (iii) as a result of a
breach of the lawyer-client relationship. The privilege may be
claimed by the client in person or by his lawyer, or if incom-
petent, by his guardian, or if deceased, by his personal repre-
sentative. The privilege available to a corporation or association
terminates upon dissolution.
(2) Exceptions. Such privileges shall not extend (a) to a
communication if the judge finds that sufficient evidence, aside
from the communication, has been introduced to warrant a find-
ing that the legal service was sought or obtained in order to
enable or aid the client to commit or plan to commit a crime or a
tort, or (b) to a communication relevant to an issue between
1956]
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parties all of whom claim through the client, regardless of
whether the respective claims are by testate or intestate succes-
sion or by inter wnvos transaction, or (c) to a communication
relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client,
or by the client to his lawyer, or (d) to a communication rele-
vant to an issue concerning an attested document of which the
lawyer is an attesting witness, or (e) to a communication rele-
vant to a matter of common interest between two or more clients
if made by any of them to a lawyer whom they have retained in
common when offered in an action between any of such clients.
(3) Defnmtions. As used in this rule (a) "Client" means a
person or corporation or other association that, directly or
through an authorized representative, consults a lawyer or the
lawyer's representative for the purpose of retaining the lawyer
or securing legal service or advice from him in his professional
capacity, and includes an incompetent whose guardian so con-
sults the lawyer or the lawyer's representative in behalf of the
incompetent, (b) "communication" includes advice given by the
lawyer in the course of representing the client and includes dis-
closures of the client to a representative, associate or employee
of the lawyer incidental to the professional relationship, (c)
"lawyer" means a person authorized, or reasonably believed by
the client to be authorized to practice law in any state or nation the
law of which recognizes a privilege against disclosure of con-
fidential communications between client and lawyer.
Who May Assert the Privilege
At common law the privilege of refusing to disclose confidential
communications from an attorney's client belonged to the attorney
himself. ° The quoted Minnesota statute protects the attorney from
being examined with respect to professional communications or
advice but. in accord with the modern rule, the privilege to allow
or prevent disclosure is in the client,61 as it would be tinder Uniform
Rule 26.
Rule 26(1) specifies those entitled to claim the privilege. Be-
sides the client himself, his attorney, his guardian if he is incoin-
petent, or his personal representative if the client has died, may
claim the privilege on his behalf. Although our court has said little
on this, probably Uniform Rule 26(1) would only be declaratory of
existing law Its explicitness makes it preferable to the present
statute on this point.
60. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2290, 2321 (3d ed. 1940)
61. Struckmeyer v. Lamb. 75 Minn. 366, 77 N. W 987 (1899) , State v.
Tall, 43 Minn. 273, 45 N. W 449 (1890), Knox v. Knox, 222 Minn. 477.
485, 25 N. W 2d 225, 230 (1946) (dictum) , State v. Madden, 161 Minn.




Communications to an Attorney.
Only communications to an actual attorney are protected by the
literal language of the Minnesota statute. On the other hand, Rule
26(3) defines "lawyer" to include not only lawyers in fact but also
persons "reasonably believed by the client to be authorized to prac-
tice law in any state or nation the law of which recognizes a privilege
against disclosure of confidential communications between client
and lawyer."
Apparently our court has not yet been required to decide
whether to enlarge the category of communicatees to whom a client
may safely divulge his confidences to include those who, while not
licensed to practice law, nevertheless hold themselves out to be
attorneys. Jurisdictions in which the problem has arisen have been
faced with the difficult choice between protecting the misinformed
client or restricting the privilege to communications made to actual
attorneys.6
2
Protection against disclosure of the communication by an em-
ployee of the attorney is insured by Uniform Rule 26(1) (c) (i)
which affords to the client the privilege to prevent disclosure by
"any other witness" who has learned of the communication "in the
course of its transmittal between the client and the lawyer.. ."' 'ore-
over, the definitions of client and communication in paragraph 3 of
the rule are framed broadly enough to include disclosures or advice
transmitted between attorney and client through authorized repre-
sentatives of either. Employees of attorneys are presently protected
from having to disclose communications between clients and their
attorneys63 and at least one case would even protect communications
from a client made directly to an attorney's clerk.04
Communications to a lawyer in his special capacity as prosecut-
ing attorney present particular problems. Although Uniform Rule
26 does not specifically discuss communications to prosecutors,
nevertheless communications of this type might be included within
62. For a consideration of various aspects of the problem, see 8 AWig-
more, Evidence §§ 2300, 2302 (3d ed. 1940), Note, 4 Minn. L. Rev. 2277
(1920) (communications to juvenile court judge); 35 Minn. L. Rev. 409
(1951) (communication to state court judge). In the following cases, the
privilege was denied: Sample v. Frost, 10 Iowa 266 (1859) (student) ;
Barnes v. Harris, 7 Cush. 576 (Mass. 1851) (student) ; Fountain v. Young,
6 Esp. 113, 170 Eng. Rep. 846 (C.P 1807) (clerk). Contra Calley v. Rich-
ards, 19 Beav. 401, 52 Eng. Rep. 406 (Ch. 1854) (former attorney).
63. Minn. Stat. § 595.02(2) (1953) ; Hilary v. Minneapolis Street Ry.,
104 Minn. 432, 434, 116 N. W. 933, 934 (1908) (dictum), 8 Wigmore, Evi-
dence § 2301 (3d ed. 1940).




the protection by virtue of the broad definition of "lawyer" n
Rule 26(3) There is no certainty that such communications are
within the present Section 595.02(2) Although the attorney-client
privilege as such may be inapplicable to communications between
individuals and prosecutors, nevertheless under appropriate circum-
stances they may still be privileged under present Minnesota law
as communications to a public officer, the disclosure of which is
contrary to the public interest.0 5 The same result may also be
reached under Rule 34.11
Requirement of Confidentality.
Although the Minnesota statute is worded in terms of protect-
ing "any communication" between attorney and client,"' it is under-
stood that the communication must be made in confidence. Absent
special circumstances, the presence of a third party other than a
representative of either the client or the attorney negatives the exist-
ence of the requisite confidentiality of communications between
client and attorney, 69 particularly where the third party is also the
opposing party at that time or later.70 Under Rule 26, if a third
party's presence is unknown to the client, there is no loss of privi-
lege by virtue of eavesdropping.
Rule 26 protects not only a communication heard by others
"in the course of its transmittal between the client and the lawyer,""
65. Minn. Stat. § 595.02(5) (1953), State v. McClendon, 172 Minn.
106, 214 N. W 782 (1927), Cole v. Andrews, 74 Minn. 93, 97-98, 76 N. \V
962, 964 (1898) (dictum) , see also 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2296, 2375 (3d
ed. 1940), 5 Minn. L. Rev. 570 (1921).
66. Rule 34. Official Information.(1) As used in this Rule, "official information" means information
not open or theretofore officially disclosed to the public relating to internal
affairs of this State or of the United States acquired by a public official
of this State or the United States in the course of his duty, or trails-
mitted from one such official to another in the course of duty.(2) A witness has a privilege to refuse to disclose a matter on the
ground that it is official information, and evidence of the matter is inad-
missible, if the judge finds that the matter is official information, and (a)
disclosure is forbidden by an Act of the Congress of the United States
or a statute of this State, or (b) disclosure of the information in the
action will be harmful to the interests of the government of which the
witness is an officer in a governmental capacity.
67 Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (1953).
68. Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 34, 62 N. W 2d 688, 700
(1954) (dictum), accord, Shove v. Martine, 85 Minn. 29, 88 N. \V 254
(1901), Eickman v. Troll, 29 Minn. 124, 12 N. W 347 (1882), see 8 \Vig-
more, Evidence § 2311 (3d ed. 1940) , 22 Minn. L. Rev. 110 (1937)
69. Accord, Davis v. New York, 0. & W Ry., 70 Minn. 37, 72 N. W
823 (1897) , see 22 Minn. L. Rev. 110, 111 (1937).
70. Knox v. Knox, 222 Minn. 477, 485, 25 N. W 2d 225, 230 (1946)(dictum) (communication in presence of one who thereafter became an
opposing party and sought to exercise the privilege) , see 22 Minn. L. Rev.
110, 111 (1937).
71. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 26(1) (c) (i) (1953).
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but in addition a third party overhearing the communication may
be restrained from disclosure if his knowledge of the communication
came about "in a manner not reasonably to be anticipated by the
client,"72 or resulted from a "breach of the lawyer-client relation-
ship."7 3
Where several persons consult one attorney in a professional
capacity, the privilege may be curtailed in a later action between
themj 4 This is specifically provided for by Rule 26(2) (e).
When an attorney is used as attesting witness to the proper
execution by the client of either a will75 or a deed,78 our court con-
siders this as clearly indicative of the client's intent that communica-
tions pertinent to such functioning by the attorney should not be
privileged. Uniform Rule 26(2) (d) is in accord.
Scope of the Privilege.
1 The privilege extends only to communications between attorney
and client in the course of their professional relationship. Con-
sequently, a communication by which the client has merely retained
a particular attorney to represent him is not now within the ambit
of the privilege.7 7 Similarly, only communications made in the
course of the professional relationship would be protected by Uni-
form Rule 26(1).
Considerations founded in the Canons of Ethics also have a
place in discussion of the scope of the attorney-client privilege.
Canon 3778 imposes the following ethical obligation upon attorneys:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences.
This duty outlasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well
to his employees; and neither of them should accept employ-
ment which involves or may involve the disclosure or use of these
confidences, either for the private advantage of the lawyer or
his employees or to the disadvantage of the client, without
his knowledge and consent, and even though there are other
72. rd. at Rule 26(1) (c) (ii).
73. d. at Rule 26 (1) (c) (iii).
74. Knox v. Knox, 222 Minn. 477, 485 ,. 9, 25 N. W 2d 225, 30 n. 9
(1946) (dictum); accord, Shove v. Martine, 85 Minn. 29, 88 N. V 254(1901) ; cf. Hanson v. Bean, 51 Minn. 546, 53 N. NV. 871 (1892) ; see Note,
16 Minn. L. Rev. 818, 821 (1932).
75. Hanefeld v. Fairbrother, 191 Minn. 547, 254 N. V. 821 (1934);
In re Estate of Wunsch, 177 Minn. 169, 225 N. W 109 (1929) ; Coates v.
Semper, 82 Minn. 460, 85 N. W 217 (1901) ; accord, it re Estate of Dorey,
210 Minn. 136, 297 N. W. 561 (1941) ; In the Matter of Layman, 40 Minn.
371, 42 N. W. 286 (1889) ; see Note, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 818, 828 (1932).
76. Larson v. Dahlstrom, 214 Minn. 304, 8 N. W 2d 48 (1943).
77. Eicman v. Troll, 29 Minn. 124, 12 N. W. 347 (1882), see ifc-
Cormicir, Evidence § 94 (1954).
78. Canons of Professional Ethics (1951).
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available sources of such information. A lawyer should not con-
tinue employment when he discovers that this obligation pre-
vents the performance of his full duty to his former or to his
new client.
If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded
from disclosing the truth in respect to the accusation. The an-
nounced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included
within the confidences which he is bound to respect. He may
properly make such disclosures as may be necessary to pre-
vent the act or protect those against whom it is threatened.
Writers in the field hold that communications made by the client
relative to plans to commit a future crime or accomplish a fraudulent
purpose should not be privileged. 9 McCormick questions whether
this exception to the privilege is broad enough or whether other
forms of tortious conduct should not also be included. 0 Uniform Rule
26(2) (a) enlarges this exception and removes from the privilege
4 a communication if the judge finds that sufficient evidence,
aside from the communication, has been introduced to warrant a
finding that the legal service was sought or obtained in order to
enable or aid the client to commit or plan to commit a crime or a
tort. " Of course there must be kept in mind the elementary dis-
tinction between situations where the client discloses plans for
future wrongdoing and cases where the communications relate to
past illegal conduct.
Another present exception to the privilege is where the client
charges the attorney with breach of duty 81 Rule 26(2) (c) broadens
this to except also situations where the client is charged with breach
of duty to his lawyer.
Termnation of the Prtilege.
Even after the relationship of attorney and client has ended,
the privilege continues to protect confidential communications made
during the course of the professional relationshp. 82 Presumably the
privilege continues even after death,8 3 although our court has
allowed communications to be disclosed where an attorney acted as
attesting witness to the testator's will.
84
79. See McCormick, Evidence § 99 (1954) (communications in further-
ance of crime or fraud) , 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2298 (3d ed. 1940) (crinu-
nal or fraudulent transaction).
80. See McCormick, Evidence § 99 (1954), see also 8 Wigmore, Evi-
dence § 2298 (3d ed. 1940).
81. Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 37 (1951).; see Note, 16
Minn. L. Rev. 818, 827 (1932).
82. Struckmeyer v. Lamb, 75 Minn. 366, 77 N. W 987 (1899)
83. See McCormick, Evidence § 98 (1954).
84. See note 75 supra.
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Rule 26(1) recognizes the privilege even after the client has
become incompetent or has died, by providing for exercise of the
privilege ly the incompetent's guardian or the decedent's personal
representative. Corporate and association privileges are lost on their
dissolution.
Rule 26 (2) (b) withdraws the privilege from communications in
controversies between parties all of whom claim through the client
by inter rivos transaction or by succession. In these situations recog-
nition of the privilege is deemed of insufficient value to outweigh
potential injustice to parties claiming title to property through a
common source. As the Minnesota court observed in an early will
contest case 5 the purpose of the privilege is to protect the client and
his estate and when preventing disclosure of confidential communica-
tions between testator and his attorney will not accomplish this
purpose there is no need to recognize the privilege. In that situation
the testimony may be vital to the protection of the estate against
contests.
Obviously, the privilege of a client may be terminated by the
client's waiver of the benefits of the privilege.86 Merely taking the
witness stand without testifying to the content of communications
should not forfeit the privilege.8 7 Rule 26 does not specifically pre-
scribe the manner in which the privilege may be waived other than
by a general reference in its first sentence to Rule 37. Rule 37 pro-
vides for loss of evidentiary privilege by contracting with anyone
that the privilege will not be claimed, or by making voluntary and
knowing disclosure of any part of the privileged matter to anyone.
This second form of waiver bears close scrutiny, in that it might
be construed to forfeit the privilege of any client who knowingly
reveals even a small portion of his legal problems to a person other
than an attorney or an employee or representative of one. There is
in Rule 37 a definite intent to prevent later exercise of the privilege
when advantageous to the client's interests after he has waived it
when his interests seemed to be benefited by waiver.8 8
Comparison and Evaluation of Rule 26.
Rule 26 represents an improvement over existing Minnesota
law, chiefly because it is more explicit. To the degree that the fol-
85. In the Matter of Layman, 40 Iinn. 371, 372-73, 42 N. VNr. 286, 287(1889).
86. State v. Madden, 161 Minn. 132, 134, 201 N. W 297, 298 (1924)(dictum); 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2327-2329; see Note, 16 Minm. L. Rev.
818 (1932) (an extensive consideration of vanous aspects of %%aiver of the
attorney-client privilege), 36 Minn. L. Rev. 408 (1952) (%vaiver by guardian
of incompetent).
87. See Note, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 818, 823-24 (1932).
88. Id. at 825.
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lowing provisions of Rule 26 represent extensions of the privilege,
we consider them improvements (i) a communication to one rea-
sonably believed to be an attorney would be privileged even though
the communicatee was not an attorney, (ii) a communication may
be privileged even though transmitted through the employees of
either attorney or client, 9 and (iii) the privilege is not lost when
overheard by an eavesdropper, improperly revealed by the attorney,
or otherwise disclosed in a manner not reasonably to be anticipated
by the client. However, Rule 26 works a narrowing of the scope of
the privilege by extending the exception applicable to communica-
tions in aid of future wrongful conduct, to include all types of con-
templated tortious conduct.
CLERGYMAN-PENITENT CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
The present Minnesota statutory provision is in Minn. Stat.
§ 595.02(3) (1953)
A clergyman or other minister of any religion shall not,
without the consent of the party making the confession, be al-
lowed to disclose a confession made to him in his professional
character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or
practice of the religious body to which he belongs, nor shall a
clergyman or other minister of any religion be examined as to
any communication made to him by any person seeking religious
or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort or his advice given thereon in
the course of his professional character, without the consent of
such person.
Minnesota lawyers will recall that the part of the foregoing
sentence after the semicolon and beginning with the words "nor
shall a clergyman ") was added by the legislature in 1931 during
the pendency of In re Contempt of Emil Swenson,90 hereinafter dis-
cussed.
The provision of the Uniform Rules corresponding to Section
595.02(3) is
Rule 29 Priest-Penitent Prwileges, Definition, Penitential
Communications.
(1) As used in this rule, (a) "priest" means a priest, clergy-
man, minister of the gospel or other officer of a church or of a
89. In connection with the problem of transmission of the communication
by the client's agents to the attorney, rather than directly by client to attorney,
see Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N. W 2d 413 (1942) It must be
remembered that in Minnesota we have not only the problem of privileged
confidential communication, but also the problem of limitation on discovery
by reason of the last sentence of Minn. R. Civ. P 26.02. See Brown v. St.
Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 32-37, 62 N. W 2d 688 (1954), Louisell, Dis-
covery and Pre-Trial under Ainnesota Rules, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 633, 635-638
(1952).
90. 183 Minn. 602, 237 N. W 589 (1931).
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religious denomination or organization, who in the course of
its discipline or practice is authorized or accustomed to hear,
and has a duty to keep secret, penitential communications made
by members of his church, denomination or organization; (b)
"penitent" means a member of a church or religious denomina-
tion or organization who has made a penitential communication
to a priest thereof; (c) "penitential communication" means a
confession of culpable conduct made secretly and in confidence
by a penitent to a priest in the course of discipline or practice of
the church or religious denomination or organization of which
the penitent is a member.
(2) A person, whether or not a party, has a privilege to
refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness from disclosing a
communication if he claims the privilege and the judge finds
that (a) the communication was a penitential communication
and (b) the witness is the penitent or the priest, and (c) the
claimant is the penitent, or the priest making the claim on be-
half of an absent penitent.
It will be noted that the present Minnesota statute affirmatively
imposes the obligation of silence on the clergyman by way of dis-
allowing any right in him to disclose the communication, and only
implies the correlative privilege in the penitent by making his
consent a condition of legal disclosure. Uniform Rule 29, on the
other hand, affirmatively states the privilege in the penitent and
allows him to prevent a disclosure, but imposes no duty of silence on
the clergyman in the absence of an act of prevention by the penitent.
Although this difference may not be of great practical significance
inasmuch as Uniform Rule 29(2) (c) allows the clergyman to make
the claim on behalf of an absent penitent, and clergymen historically
have displayed great fidelity to their obligation of secrecy, neverthe-
less from the theoretical viewpoint at least it would seem that the
present Minnesota statute is preferable insofar as it imposes on the
clergyman the affirmative duty of silence.
Perhaps a more serious defect in Uniform Rule 29 is its limita-
tion of the privilege to situations where the witness is the penitent or
the clergyman. -Uniform Rule 26 accords the lawyer's client not only
the right to refuse to disclose a professional communication him-
self and to prevent his lawyer from disclosing it, but also "to pre-
vent any other witness from disclosing such communication if it
came, to the knowledge of such witness (i) in the course of its
transmittal between the client and the lawyer, or (ii) in a manner
not reasonably to be anticipated by the client, or (iii) as a result
of the breach of the lawyer-client relationship." This has the salutary
effect in the attorney-client relationship of protecting the privilege
against intrusions offensive to normal ethical standards, such as
19561
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those of eavesdroppers, and of clarifying an area now beclouded by
cases disallowing the privilege where confidentiality in fact was
lacking although the lack resulted from improper conduct by the
eavesdropper or other infringer.91 Rule 29, we submit, should simi-
larly protect against the eavesdropper or like infringer.
Perhaps, however, the Minnesota Legislature in considering
Uniform Rule 29 will be most concerned with the fact that its
enactment would in substance effect a repeal of the aforequoted por-
tion of Section 595.02 which was enacted in 1931. Discussion of tls
invokes consideration of the celebrated case of In re Contempt of
Emil Swenson.9 2 A wife was seeking a divorce from her husband
on the ground of adultery The husband telephoned relator, a
Lutheran minister and pastor of the church where the husband
and wife had worshipped, and asked permission to see and talk
with the minister. The request was granted and the husband came
immediately He was received in the sitting room wherein others
were present. The husband said "I want to see you in your private
office." In order that the conversation might be secret, the two went
to the minister's study and there behind closed doors the husband
said to the minister "I have something that I want to tell you.
and under the circumstances it is very hard for me to face my
pastor." In the divorce suit the minister testified that on the de-
scribed occasion they had discussed the husband's intimate affairs.
The wife sought to prove by the minister that her husband had
stated to the minister that he, the husband, had had adulterous
relations with a named woman. The minister refused to testify as to
the communication made on the ground that the statements so made
to him were privileged as communications to a clergyman. The M in-
nesota statute in force at the time provided
"A clergyman or other minister of any religion shall not,
without the consent of the party making the confession, be
allowed to disclose a confession made to him in his professional
character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or
practice of the religious body to which he belongs.93
The district court disallowed the claimed privilege and adjudged the
minister in contempt for refusal to answer. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota on certiorari reversed, holding that the communication
was within the statute and privileged. It was a confidential peni-
91. Commonwealth v. Everson, 123 Ky. 330, 96 S. W 460 (1906)(husband-wife privilege analogized to that of lawyer-client) , Hammons v.
State, 73 Ark. 495, 84 S. W 718 (1905) (letter of husband who was in jail
to wife, misdelivered).
92. 183 Minn. 602, 237 N. W 589 (1931).
93. 2 Mason Minn. Stat. 1927, Sec. 9814(3).
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tential communication made in the course of discipline of the
minister's church. Any other conclusion, the court reasoned, would
have restricted applicability of the statute to Catholic confessions,
an interpretation deemed absurd by the court in our religiously
pluralistic society. The court disregarded as inapplicable the amend-
ment to the foregoing statute which had become a law during the
pendency of the case. The amendment provides:
... nor shall a clergyman or other minister of any religion
be examined as to any communication made to him by any per-
son seeking religious or spiritual advicp, aid, or comfort or his
advice given thereon in the course of his professional character,
without the consent of such person.94
There seems to be no helpful case applying this amendment.
Christensen v. Pestorioza 5 involved only social conversation be-
tween an injured person and her pastor; the communication was not
penitential nor in confidence, nor did it involve spiritual advice or
comfort. It therefore was not privileged.
The quoted amendment of 1931, while unconstrued, clearly on
its face carries the privilege of confidential communication between
pastor and "any person seeking religious or spiritual advice, aid,
or comfort" far beyond the limits of the penitential confession privi-
leged by our statute prior to the 1931 amendment. Uniform Rule 29
would in substance effect a repeal of the amendment, and cause the
law to revert, in respect of communications covered by the privilege,
to its pre-1931 amendment status. This would seem to be the inten-
tion of Uniform Rule 29, for in the Comment to it it is stated: "The
privilege is intentionally limited to communications by communi-
cants within the sanctity and under the necessity of their own dis-
ciplinary requirements. Any broader treatment would open the door
to abuse and would clearly not be in the public interest." In view of
the Minnesota experience it is clear that this conclusion is at least
open to argument and should receive full consideration before the
rule is adopted.
CONCLUSION
As is indicated by the above discussion, the provisions of the
Uniform Rules as to the privileges dealt with are in some respects
an improvement over the present Minnesota law, either by 'way
of substance or as a matter of clarification. But it is equally clear
that there are areas where the Uniform Rules do not provide some
94. Minn. Laws 1931, ch. 206;'Minn. Stat. § 595.02(3) (1953).
95. 189 Minn. 548, 250 N. W. 363 (1933).
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protection now existing, which seems to be necessary or desirable to
accomplish the policies behind the existence of the privilege.
In any event, the kind of argument one must get into in evaluat-
ing the privileges shows that alteration of them involves that type
of weighing of policy considerations which is normally a legislative
function subject only to constitutional inhibitions, if any Conse-
quently, it would be a real mistake to attempt to introduce the Urn-
form Rules' privilege provisions other than by legislative action. It
is hoped that this treatment will help to point out some of the prob-
lems to be resolved as part of such a legislative process.
